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THE

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO School of Law ("U.S.F.")
created a Center for Applied Legal Ethics ("CALE" or "Center") in
the spring of 2000. The event provided an opportunity to reflect on
how to educate law students about ethics. To take advantage of this
opportunity, and to begin a dialogue that we hope will continue for
many years to come, the Center asked four scholars to write about
teaching values in law school. The scholars are: Christopher Eisgruber, Director, Program in Law and Public Affairs, and Laurance A.
Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School and
the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University; Joshua
Rosenberg, Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of
Law; Paul Tremblay, Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law
School; and W. Bradley Wendel, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. The full statement to which the scholars were
asked to respond is reproduced at the end of this introduction.
I.

The Articles

The contribution by Professor Christopher Eisgruber offers an intriguing account of why teaching values in law school is perhaps best
understood as getting students to remember the beliefs they already
hold. He adapts to law teaching an idea he explored in his article in
Associate Professor of Law and Chair, Faculty Legal Ethics Committee, Center for
Applied Legal Ethics, University of San Francisco School of Law. I received valuable
comments on this introduction from John Adler, Jeff Brand, and Alice Kaswan. It also was
improved by the thoughtful comments of Dulci Grantham, whose hard work and good
sense have been a great benefit to this Symposium, the University of San Francisco Law
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Review, and the law school. The Center would not exist, and this Symposium issue of the

Law Review would not have occurred, without the enthusiasm and support of the Center's
Director, Richard Zitrin; the former Dean of the University of San Francisco School of

Law, Jay Folberg; and the current Dean of the law school, Jeff Brand.
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the New York University Law Review on whether the Supreme Court
1
can function as an educative institution.
Harkening back to Plato's Meno, Professor Eisgruber's idea is that
the effective teaching of values in fact often entails appealing to values
a person already possesses, and showing them that their views on a
particular subject do not reflect the best understanding of those values. As I hoped he might, Professor Eisgruber develops similar notions in the context of legal education. He discusses teaching values as
a form of helping students to remember the values they already have,
and as helping them to refine proper application of those values. 2
Professor Eisgruber is not optimistic, however, that this can be
done in law school, particularly in large classrooms where students are
unlikely to be open to discussion about their values, or to any effort to
get them to reconsider how they best apply. More promising, according to Professor Eisgruber, is the effort to affirm well-intentioned students in their commitment to remain ethical and moral when they
practice law, including by disabusing them of the notion that they
must abandon justice if they are to understand the law properly, by
providing mentorship to students, by alerting well-intentioned students to various potential ethical hazards in the practice of law, and by
instilling in students a view of legal practice that aspires to more than
just securing wealth. None of these efforts requires changing students'
values or their understanding of their values.
Professor Eisgruber's article, I believe, not only provides valuable
guidance, but also suggests various ways in which trying to accomplish
too much in the effort to teach values in law school may do more
harm than good. To borrow from one of the points in his article, Professor Eisgruber identifies the potential harm that can be done by the
well-intentioned law professor seeking to teach values, and "we all
know what kind of roads are paved with good intentions." 3
Professor Joshua Rosenberg, my colleague at the University of
San Francisco School of Law, largely agrees with Professor Eisgruber's
pessimism about teaching values in the ordinary law school class. However, where Professor Eisgruber explores the limited but important
role law professors can play in strengthening students' commitment to
1. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an EducativeInstitution?, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 961 (1992).
2. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Can Law Schools Teach Values?, 36 U.S.F. L.
REv. 603 (2002), infra.
3. Id. at 613, infra.
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their values, Professor Rosenberg offers a creative alternative to traditional law teaching.
For years Professor Rosenberg has taught a class at the Stanford
Business School on interpersonal dynamics, and he has brought a version of the class to the University of San Francisco School of Law. The
class is called "Interpersonal Dynamics for Lawyers." It addresses not
substantive law, but rather the interpersonal dynamics between law
students. How a lawyer interacts with others is perhaps as important as
any other skill or attribute in a successful legal practice. Yet it is a topic
that receives little attention at most law schools. 4 Among the many

lessons Professor Rosenberg hopes the students in his class learn is
how to empathize more effectively. This can have all sorts of salutary
effects that Professor Rosenberg explores, including reforming students' value systems, enabling them to act on the values they already
possess, and motivatingthem to act consistently with their values. Professor Rosenberg is nothing if not creative, and reading about how his
class works and some of the discussions it has produced is intriguing,
provocative, and instructive.
Professor W. Bradley Wendel tackles the problem of teaching values to students in a more familiar environment. His concern is with
the student who engages in an easy cynicism about the nature of ethical truth, a cynicism founded on skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism. He first describes what he believes are the reasons that law
students tend to be cynical in this way, and then provides an argument
for why the everyday experiences of law students in passing value judgments on behavior, and acting on those judgments, provide enough
objectivity to warrant a serious rational engagement about legal ethics.
What he leaves us with is a valuable defense of reason-giving in legal
ethics, one that recognizes and touches on the deep issues that arise
in developing some notion of objectivity but that does a remarkable
job of not getting bogged down in those issues. For me, his analysis
provides a valuable defense of rational discourse about values that I
expect to explore in class.
The upshot of Professor Wendel's analysis is that we can properly
engage in substantive ethical arguments, rather than having to focus
on the meta-ethical foundations of those arguments. In particular,
4. A rare exception is the Center for Applied Legal Studies, a clinic at the Georgetown University Law Center, where I had the pleasure of teaching as a fellow for two
years. A brief discussion of how the Center for Applied Legal Studies addresses interpersonal dynamics is found in Jane Aiken, David Koplow, Lisa Lerman, J.P. Ogilvy, and Philip
Schrag, The Learning Contract in Legal Education,44 MD. L. Rv. 1047, 1051, 1060 (1985).
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Professor Wendel would have us lead students in thinking through
ethical problems "from the bottom up. ' 5 In other words, rather than
start from very abstract principles, his analysis supports beginning with
agreement about what is wrong and what is right in particular situations, and reasoning by analogy and generalizing to more abstract ethical principles. This he offers as a practical and promising way to build
on the everyday practice of students in rendering moral judgments,
and to have them extend that practice to problems in legal ethics.
In many ways, one can understand Professor Paul Tremblay's article as complementing Professor Wendel's analysis, and taking up
where Professor Wendel leaves off. Professor Tremblay shares Professor Wendel's view that we can engage in meaningful debate and discussion of values-both scholars are, if you will, skeptical of
skepticism. Professor Tremblay also offers a response to relativism, as
well as to concerns that the role of faith or the incommensurability of
values could be an obstacle to teaching values or relying on them in
legal ethics. Professor Tremblay then offers a rich account of a
method of reasoning through ethical and moral dilemmas-one that
Professor Wendel might well accept as a valid approach to proceeding
from the bottom up.6 Professor Tremblay recognizes that his preferred method of ethical and moral reasoning is likely to be of particular benefit to lawyers (and law students) who try to do the right thing
but who are not sure what that is. He holds much less hope for teaching and talking about values with legal practitioners who are not inclined to try to act properly, noting that many of those lawyers may be
overwhelmed and out of control, and would need the benefit of institutional reform if they are to mend their ways. Much like Professor
Eisgruber, Professor Tremblay focuses on law students who are wellintentioned in the first place.
Professor Tremblay's preferred method of ethical reasoning relies on the notion of casuistry. Casuistry does not purport to be an
ethical or moral theory. Indeed, Professor Tremblay would not recommend attempting to teach law students a general ethical or moral theory at all (although he does not deny the potential value of exploring
those theories). Rather casuistry is an ethical practice, one that works
5.

See W. Bradley Wendel, TeachingEthics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism,

36 U.S.F. L. Rv. 713 (2002), infra.
6. Indeed, Professor Tremblay describes casuistry as proceeding "from the ground
up," a metaphor that has more than a superficial resemblance, I believe, to how Professor
Tremblay would have students engage moral and ethical problems. See Paul R. Tremblay,
Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 692 (2002), infra.
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from paradigmatic situations to cast light on how to act in situations
that are more problematic. It is an inductive process, resembling in
many ways the reasoning law students undertake in learning how to
interpret and apply precedent. Professor Tremblay is optimistic about
the prospects for argument about values through casuistry. This optimism is based in part on sociological evidence that Americans do in
fact share the same values on many important questions, and that they
are much more likely to disagree about the facts relevant to ethical or
moral decisions than about the ethical or moral aims to be pursued.
I.

Applying the Articles

One virtue of the articles in this Symposium is that they are of use
in the practice of teaching. For me, in particular, they help to clarify
some of the choices I have made in teaching Legal Ethics, as well as to
suggest ways in which I might reform what I do. In elaborating on
these points, it is worthwhile to say a few words about my understanding of what I try to achieve in teaching Legal Ethics. My aim is to
suggest some of the ways in which the contributions to this Symposium offer guidance that is useful to the average professor of law.
One point seems worth making at the outset. I believe that I do
not generally argue with students over particular moral or ethical issues, nor do I tend to preach to them about the values they should
hold. I do not want to overstate this point. I do believe that some
positions on ethics and morals are hard to take seriously. I do not
think that I would be reluctant to press a student, for example, who
claims that killing innocent children is not wrong. But in my experience students rarely assert truly indefensible moral or ethical positions, positions that are so contrary to my intuitions about right or
wrong that I almost cannot resist debating with them. On most occasions, students seem sincere and reasonable (or not outrageous) in
their positions, and, when they do, I am not inclined to argue with
them, although I am eager to explore their views, challenge their
thinking, and facilitate a meaningful engagement among members of
the class.
At times, I have wondered whether I should express my views in a
more heavy handed way. My reluctance to do so, however, finds support in particular in Professor Chris Eisgruber's analysis. After all, as
he notes, students are unlikely to be persuaded to change their values,
or to revise their understanding of the best interpretation of their values, or to reconsider how they should apply their values, unless they
are sufficiently comfortable to discuss their values openly. Moral edu-
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cation, as Professor Eisgruber explains, is likely to succeed, if at all,
only if it is addressed specifically to the individual student. To do this,
the teacher must learn what a student believes, and where her doubts
lie. In other words, the student must be forthcoming about her views.
Whether it is possible to get students to be this open in a classroom is
questionable. If it is possible, however, it will result from a level of
comfort unlikely in the presence of a judgmental professor. This suggests that while didacticism by the professor is intended to persuade, it
is apt to have the opposite effect. It is likely to create an educational
environment inhospitable to the sort of vulnerability that is necessary
for a student to reconsider her values and their application.
Professor Rosenberg adds yet another reason to question arguing
with or preaching to students. As he notes, empathy may play various
roles in morality. Debating and proselytizing do not generally involve
empathy. They do not model for the students an attentiveness to the
thoughts of others, or to their feelings. If professors will not listen in
earnest to their students in a legal ethics class, and will not thereby
encourage students to listen to one another, students are unlikely to
see understanding different perspectives as integral to the practice of
law. This may, in effect, undermine any effort to develop their values,
and to inspire students to act on those values. After reading Professor
Rosenberg's piece, I will be more focused on the issue of interpersonal dynamics in class. I will try to be attentive to why the structure
and tone of a given class, on a given day, encouraged students to
speak candidly and comfortably.
Beyond these general comments, there is a particular method of
teaching in legal ethics that the contributions to this Symposium have
caused me to view in a new light or, I should say, in several new lights.
That method is the use of exercises that simulate legal practice, and, I
believe, it creates real opportunities for teaching about values. The
Legal Ethics classes at the University of San Francisco School of Law
are generally limited to twenty-four students, which has allowed me to
undertake a large number of exercises. Generally, these involve some
aspect of the practice of law, including, for example, taking or defending a deposition, revealing to a client a potential conflict of interest,
engaging in an oral argument before a court, and negotiating with
opposing counsel or an unrepresented party. 7 I believe these exercises
7. In fact, I work with students, two at a time, who develop the exercises that will be
used in the class. We meet from once to half a dozen times or more, and write and rewrite
instructions, roles, and other handouts that will be used in class.

Spring 20021

TEACHING VALUES SYMPOSIUM

lie at the heart of any lessons about ethics and morality the students
may learn in my class.
The exercises perform several functions. First, they teach students
a bit about the practice of law. Almost all of them involve skills and
situations that few of the students have encountered in the past.
A second function of the exercises is to allow students to identify
ethical issues in context. I try to embed in each exercise ethical dilemmas, some obvious and others subtle. None of the dilemmas comes
with a label attached. Many of the students miss the dilemmas, even
the obvious ones. This is to be expected. New situations are disorienting. My hope is to orient the students, to help them to recognize
ethical issues when they arise in practice. Again, on this point, Professor Eisgruber's article is relevant. He explains that one of the roles a
law professor can and should play in encouraging ethical behavior is
to alert students to some of the hazards they will face in legal practice.
A third function of the exercises is to encourage students to make
commitments while they are still in law school about how they think
they should behave when they are in legal practice. My aim is not so
much to reform the values of the students, as to get them to commit to
their current values. I do not want to leave them to assess what is and
is not ethical on various issues until they are operating under the pressures of the practice of the law, in the presence of too many lawyers
who have rationalized whatever behavior is expedient in a given circumstance. My hope is that a student who is contemplating some ethically dubious conduct, and who sees others in legal practice engage in
that conduct, may realize how critical she was of that kind of behavior
when she had the time and the distance to examine it objectively in
law school. Perhaps she will pause, think about what she risks becoming, and decide not to engage in behavior that, as a law student, she
would have considered unethical or immoral. This approach resonates with Professor Eisgruber's view that teaching values may, in a
sense, really involve getting students to remember their values, and
with his notion that the best a law professor may be able to do is to
keep students committed to the values they already possess.
A fourth, and perhaps final, function of the exercises is to serve as
a point of departure for discussion and analysis. In particular, I want
to challenge students who assume a prematurely jaded view, who are
cynical about ethics and morality in the law. The most common form
of this cynicism is to take an extreme view of the adversarial nature of
legal practice, and to assume that all practicing lawyers have as their
one, overriding ethical commitment the goal of achieving everything
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they possibly can for their clients, regardless of the means. Other common forms of cynicism are more sweeping, and often entail doubts
that one can meaningfully say any conduct is right or wrong. Exercises
provide a way to challenge this easy cynicism, to show students that in
practice, in context, they often have clear views on what conduct is
ethical, and that those views can be ordered according to some general principles that provide guidance in problematic situations.
On this point, the articles of Professors Wendel and Tremblay are
of particular use. Professors Wendel and Tremblay offer important arguments as to the viability of rational engagement about values. Moreover, their contributions suggest valuable points of departure for
persuading students that it is worthwhile to discuss the values they
hold, and their applicability to particular situations. I may well derive
from Professor Wendel's article an exercise that will analyze the various ways in which students act on their values, and believe that they
can articulate rational justifications of those values. The goal will be to
encourage students to embrace discussing values in class. Similarly,
Professor Tremblay has inspired me to identify various points of consensus about values among students in class, and to explore the extent
to which students' views diverge, not because they disagree on underlying values or because they are unwilling to debate and discuss values,
but because of their differences of opinion on facts about the world.
In these ways, I find the articles in this Symposium issue valuable.
No doubt other readers will take other lessons from them. I encourage you to read and respond to them. We see this Symposium
issue not as making authoritative pronouncements, but as opening a
discussion through the Center for Applied Legal Ethics.

M.

A Brief Background on the Center for Applied Legal

Ethics
A few more words are in order about the Center. It seeks to promote the ethical practice of law. It aspires to be both practical and
theoretical, to ensure that abstract positions on legal ethics are
brought to bear on and disciplined by the realities of practice. The
goals of the Center include developing, discussing, and experimenting with different methods for teaching legal ethics, and writing
and supporting scholarship on legal ethics. This Symposium issue promotes these goals, falling, as it does, at the intersection of teaching
and scholarship.
The success of the Center will depend first and foremost on the
efforts of its Director, Richard Zitrin, as well as on the contributions of
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the members of the Center's Faculty Legal Ethics Committee (Dean
Brand, Professors Adler, Folberg, Mounts, Putz, and me), and on the
fine work of leaders in the field of legal ethics in California, who contribute to the Center and the law school in many ways, including by
teaching Legal Ethics at the University of San Francisco School of
Law. This last group includes Judith Epstein, Richard Heafey, Carol
Langford, Todd Peterson, and Mark Tuft, to whom the law school is
profoundly grateful.
Participants in the Center have been "doing" legal ethics for a
while, well before the Center was formed. They will continue their
activities as part of CALE. This is appropriate, after all, in a Center
that focuses on applied legal ethics. I take that word to mean, among
other things, that we should act. And participants at the Center have
been acting.
At the heart of the Center is its Director, Richard Zitrin. He travels around the country speaking about legal ethics, including at orientation programs on ethics at law schools. He also writes books on the
subject and contributes to bar associations and the like in an effort to
promote the ethical practice of law. Additionally, he serves as an expert, an advisor, and an advocate on ethical issues. Similarly, as Chair
of the Faculty Legal Ethics Committee at the Center, I have provided
counsel on ethical issues in the law. I have served as Reporter for the
California Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on Multijurisdictional
Practice, and I will serve as the Reporter on the committee that will
advise the California Supreme Court on how to implement the Report
of the Advisory Task Force. In undertaking these and other tasks, our
hope is to improve in some small way the ethics of legal practitioners
and the legal profession.
The greatest part of our energy, however, is spent right here at
the University of San Francisco School of Law, where we teach legal
ethics and try to foster in our students a commitment to the ethical
practice of law. Our aspirations, of course, go well beyond explaining
to students the technical requirements of various ethical codes and
pertinent doctrines. We hope that students will consider and discuss
their beliefs about what it means to be both an ethical and moral lawyer-and, indeed, an ethical and moral person-and that they will be
inspired to act ethically and morally. These are obvious aims for teaching legal ethics and the law-obvious in the sense that they are not
novel, even if not every law professor would agree that law school
should pursue them. It is not at all obvious, however, whether law
school can affect law students' views on ethics and morality, whether it
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should do so, and, if it can, how it should do so. That is why those are
the issues that we asked the participants in this Symposium issue of
the U.S.F. Law Review to use as a basis for writing articles. To be precise, the following is the topic to which contributors responded:
Every law school attempts to teach its students legal ethics,
most obviously through a mandatory class on professional responsibility. Some would characterize this effort as reflecting a fundamental goal of a law school: To shape the values of the legal
practitioners it will graduate. This goal raises questions of both
practical and theoretical importance.
The practical questions include which values law professors
should teach and how they should teach them. The legal academy
today is squeamish about moral education, in a way that many
teachers (and philosophers) of antiquity were not. As a result, law
professors may be hesitant to reveal the values they promote in the
classroom and the methods they use to engage in the moral education of their students. Surely, however, law professors-particularly
but not only those assigned to teach legal ethics-do attempt to
impart some values, and make some conscious decisions about how
they may effectively and legitimately go about imparting them.
This Symposium issue of the University of San Francisco Law Review asks law professors to invite others into their classrooms to
understand their goals in teaching values to law students, the methods they employ, and the successes and failures they have met.
These practical questions about teaching values in law school
lead naturally into theoretical questions about the nature of legal
education. Many would characterize western education as dedicated to the free and critical analysis of our political, economic,
social and religious institutions, including the practice of law. Arguably essential to this analysis is a measure of neutrality among
competing theories of the good. Some may dismiss such neutrality
as merely masking value choices. Others may accept it as a possibility, but reject it, at least in part, as inconsistent with the obligation
of law schools to socialize ethical participants in the practice of law.
How would you situate the values you teach law students and your
methods for teaching them in your view of the role of legal education as part of the political structure of our society?
We ask you, in sum, to address the following questions:
Should law professors attempt to influence the values of law students? How, if at all, can they do so, both effectively and legitimately? Which values should law professors promote?

